From Washington to Warsaw

Conservative populists should celebrate the project’s international victories.

By Anthony J. Constantini

The Western populist Right has been on something of an electoral tear lately. The British Reform Party recently swept England’s local elections and looks set to win a majority the next time national elections come around. Romania’s George Simion unexpectedly outperformed his polls, winning the first round of his country’s presidential elections and narrowly losing the second. The German AfD is now the country’s most popular party, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party is still polling in clear first place and has been for years. Portugal’s populist-right Chega party now has as many seats as the country’s center-left, up from zero in 2019. And polls show that the French populist Right could win their country’s presidency for the first time ever in the next elections, despite radical measures to tamp their popularity down. These are developments the Trump administration has welcomed and even encouraged, with Vice President JD Vance all but endorsing the AfD and speaking out against Romania’s attempts to block populist-right candidates from running.

But some commentators have asked—and non-political Americans may be thinking—so what? On the surface, not much would seem to link a populist-inclined Romanian voter with the concerns of a mom in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Compared to worries about the cost of gas or childcare, issues of civilizational unity seem silly. Why should the ‘America First’ New Right care about who Europeans are electing, especially when we have plenty of political priorities to focus on here at home? It’s a fair question. But those who are skeptical should consider what these wins could do to help move the West’s—and, specifically, America’s—Overton window to the Right, and more importantly, keep it there.

This isn’t to say that the window has not already shifted somewhat. The realignment on the American Right—which moved from the fusionism of the 1990s and 2000s to a populist-imbued nationalism with the elections of President Trump—has seen its reflection throughout Europe. The European “old Right” mostly focused on cutting taxes and, like the GOP’s old guard, embraced diversity initiatives and was not particularly concerned with blocking mass migration. When faced with the refugee crisis in 2015, the same year Trump surged to the front of the Republican primary on a “build the wall” message, European voters began ditching conservative parties of yesteryear for more responsive populist parties.

But why does that similarity matter? Domestically, it simply helps the United States to not be alone. The first time around, Trump was essentially the only major Western populist in charge, something of a political space alien for globalists in Brussels to gawk at. But now, President Trump and Vice President Vance can travel throughout the West while having friendly conversations with like-minded foreign leaders. Both had positive visits with Italy’s Meloni. Trump met the president of Poland and invited a verifiable retinue of populist-right figures to his inauguration.

This all helps build up the idea in the popular consciousness, among American voters and in Europe, that Trump’s victories were not some twice-repeated accident but were instead signs of a genuine shift—part of a phenomenon across the West. For the clearest evidence, look to the streets. Trump’s first term was greeted with the largest protest in American history. This year, nothing has come close. There’s a reason why you may have heard significantly fewer cries of ‘This is not normal’ in Trump’s second term, even though he has tried to do more in the realm of norm-breaking. It’s because now, throughout the West, putting one’s country first is normal. 

Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan has been refashioned around the West by ascendant leaders. Simion wants to “Make Romania Great Again” and carries around MAGA hats. Argentine President Javier Milei’s administration, when defending a decree to limit migration, said they sought to “Make Argentina Great Again.” Milei separately said he wished to “Make the West Great Again” too, and Meloni used the same verbiage in her own meeting with Trump. The Italian prime minister also recently defended “concepts like nation and patriotism” as important: “When we see our flag, if we feel proud, it means that we feel the pride to be part of a community, and that we are ready to do our part to make its fate better.”

Part of the reason why populations from Warsaw to Washington have reacted similarly is that, while there are obvious differences between America and Europe, their populations are mostly cut from the same cloth. America’s constitutional governance is a direct descendent of European Enlightenment thought. Many European constitutions today are directly based on American ideals, and while European free speech is far more restricted than America’s, it is still more liberal than almost anywhere else in the world. None of this is to even mention America’s cultural dominance in Europe, where in 2023 over 70% of movie tickets sold were for American-produced films and only about a quarter were for European productions.

But this shift has not just been esoteric. It has a direct effect on the ease of policymaking for both American and European leaders. It is harder to critique the idea of mass deportations as a radical approach when multiple parties in Europe are winning elections on platforms calling for ‘remigration’—that is, the return to the country of origin—of illegal migrants. When even Europe—long disdained by American conservatives as a hotbed of progressivism—are coming around on issues like these, it puts to bed the notion that these ideas are any way out of the mainstream of offensively radical.

There are even smaller-scale issues that mirror those faced in the United States. Take the battle over public schools. Local school board elections, which often determine the curriculums of public schools, animated the Right during the Biden administration, as activists wanted to push back against what they saw as left-wing indoctrination in public school curriculums. But similar fights animated the populist Right in Europe too: the founder of Bulgaria’s populist-right Revival party became so fed up with left-wing messaging in school textbooks that he wrote his own textbook on Bulgarian history. When like-minded individuals and parties across the West have similar experiences, they can share strategies on how they succeeded (or warnings on how they failed). Europe once served as a testing ground for America’s progressive policies; Justice Anthony Kennedy cited the European Court of Human Right’s pro-gay rulings when justifying his own in Lawrence v Texas. Now, as Right populists on both sides of the Atlantic continue to make policy, they can similarly inspire each other.

And adding fuel to the normalization, this populist shift has not only occurred in right-wing parties. When center-left leaders like the United Kingdom’s Keir Starmer are visiting Rome to learn about how Meloni is using third-country processing centers to address their migrants crisis and is talking about how mass migration will turn his country into an “island of strangers,” you know the sentiment on the ground has shifted.

Right-wing success in Europe will also help the Trump administration’s foreign policy goals. Right now, the Trump administration has been essentially forced to ignore Europe when it comes to preparing for a multipolar world order and taking on China because European Union leadership has made it painfully clear that they are not interested in either. The liberal democrats in Brussels are hanging onto the old world order, as anything that could break from the past 30 years of American-provided defense will detonate a financial time bomb for all Europe. And they are likewise hesitant to push back on Chinese influence, as doing so could jeopardize access to cheap Chinese goods and large Chinese investments. In fact, they have so aggravated the administration that Europe has reportedly been moved to the back of the queue when it comes to securing a trade deal. America’s frustration with Europe’s lack of interest in preparing for the future was readily apparently immediately after Trump re-took the White House, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio ignoring an invitation to a foreign ministers meeting and cancelling another meeting with the EU’s foreign policy chief at the last minute due to “scheduling issues,” after she had already flown across the Atlantic.

These moves are understandable and, after years of European intransigence, justified. But it would obviously be easier for the Trump administration’s foreign policy goals if the continent were instead full of like-minded allies who sought to promote Western civilization and a world where borders matter and migration is taken seriously—instead of the neoliberal globalism of yesteryear.

Plus, while the United States does not need to continue the military presence it has had in Europe the past 80 years, it would not be in our national interest for the continent to come entirely under the spell of anti-Americanism. By building relationships with ascendent populist-right parties, figures, and countries, America can help ensure that Europe recognizes and reacts to the danger of Chinese Communist Party influence. After all, individuals and countries that share the same values often work well together. At best, it could help form a Western bloc, allowing Europe to focus on Russia and the United States on China.

But working to strengthen these groups cannot simply be an ad hoc series of meetings where both sides talk about saving the West. While no one would doubt that the movement is currently seeing electoral success, unified change has proven elusive. 

There are myriad ways that a deeper alliance could pay off for all involved and could allow the opening of doors which had previously been closed. Take migration, the issue which helped first propel American and European populists at the beginning of the wave ten years ago.

For the last decade, populists wishing to block mass and illegal migrations have been stymied in their efforts by international law. A series of Cold War-era international treaties on asylum have allowed effectively anyone who steps foot on a state’s territory to claim asylum. This often kicks off a years-long process in which asylum seekers can appeal ad nauseum until one aspect of their story is accepted by a new host country. One Afghan man in Austria claimed he had a right to asylum due to a local blood feud in his home country; over ten years later, his case is still processing in the courts. And many who arrive in Europe and the US are economic migrants, simply seeking higher salaries, who upon arriving find frivolous reasons to claim asylum. This has all resulted in the swelling of refugee and migrant populations without a real discussion on why asylum should have been granted in the first place.

When liberal internationalists dominated the ranks of Western governments, there was no interest in or ability to challenge these harmful international laws. But with a series of populist-right leaders in power, they could sink these treaties. Alone, any one leader would likely be buried by negative press reactions and the condemnation of other leaders. But together, they can drive real change in the service of the will of the people.

This is not to say that the American New Right needs to get involved in local Italian elections. But it is good to have friends—actual like-minded friends who think like us and want what we want—and being ‘America First’ does not necessitate ignoring political developments in the rest of the world. This is why President Trump, Vice President Vance, and many others in the New Right have cheered on these victories: because it furthers our own priorities and, ultimately, creates a better international system.

There is, at this moment, a symphony of right-wing populism sounding across the West. The American Right should join the chorus.