Whose Realism Is It, Anyway?
Weighing the New Right’s competing foreign-policy camps
By Anthony J. Constantini, political and foreign policy analyst and writer for Upward News
With the second ascent of President Donald Trump to the White House, realism has almost entirely replaced neoconservatism as the guiding star for Republican foreign policy. This is a gargantuan and positive shift which will surely have a massive impact on America, and the world, for decades to come. What exactly that shift will look like, however, is still unclear.
Neoconservatism’s dominance saw America seek to spread democracy by force throughout the world, leading to extended and unpopular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as countless other smaller locations across the globe. Realism, which replaces the adventurist goals of democracy promotion with a foreign policy based purely on the national interest, will take America onto a fundamentally different path.
But realism’s newfound dominance should come with something of an asterisk, as what Republican “realism” means is currently disputed by two competing groups. Both call themselves realists and promote America first. But they have wildly different concepts of what such a policy entails. There is no universally agreed upon terminology currently for these individuals, but they generally fall into two baskets: I’ll call them “non-interventionist realists” and “pragmatic realists.”
Non-interventionist realists, like Senator Rand Paul and Director of National Intelligence-designate Tulsi Gabbard, see “realism” primarily through the lens of, as the name implies, not intervening abroad. They argue America’s national interest is best served by doing as little abroad as possible: fewer (or no) permanent military alliances, such as NATO, and drastic reductions in America’s participation in international organizations. While this includes disdain for “forever wars”—something they share with the pragmatists—it also includes opposition to America’s permanent global network of military bases and a distaste for foreign humanitarian and military aid (see Senator Paul’s resistance to Ukraine aid earlier this year). Fundamentally, they are skeptical toward most anything to do with the international order and America’s actions within it. They are not isolationists (a false canard), though they sometimes adopt a “Fortress America” mentality espoused by John Quincy Adams in his 1821 “Monsters to Destroy” speech: “[America] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”
Other than responding to outright attack, the one exception when it comes to action abroad that the non-interventionists do sometimes support concerns American dominance of the western hemisphere, seeking to uphold the Monroe Doctrine; for example, non-interventionists aren’t lining up to voice outrage at Trump’s musings on retaking the Panama Canal.
This contrasts with the pragmatists, who see Adams’ speech more as a guidebook and less as gospel. Pragmatic realists, such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy-designate Elbridge Colby, go where the national interest leads. While that does not include wanton democracy promotion, it can include action abroad if doing so clearly serves that interest, either alone or in military alliances—complete with bases and sustained power projection. To them, Adams’ principle—America first—is good, but his policy—Fortress America—is inadequate for the needs of the 21st century.
Some non-interventionist realists have accused pragmatists of being neoconservatives in sheep’s clothing, and in doing so have merged neoconservatives with “hawks,” who simply are more comfortable with using military force. But these descriptions are unfair. Pragmatists do not seek to spread democracy, as the neoconservatives did; as the American Conservative’s Sumatra Maitra argued, discussing some of Trump’s more pragmatic picks for foreign policy positions, “they are not nation-builders.” But they recognize that keeping America safe means interfacing with the rest of the world, militarily or otherwise, to protect America’s national interest.
These contending worldviews, though both ostensibly realist, result in serious policy differences and outcomes. Trump seems intent on balancing both in his second term, but appears to favor the pragmatic streak he had during his first, though now with more focus and clearly outlined goals. To help lock in America’s turn toward realism, conservatives would do well to help the president continue along this course.
Take Europe. The GOP is almost universally tired of funding Europe’s social safety nets by way of paying their national defense bills. A poll in early 2024 found that a clear majority of Republicans view NATO in an unfavorable light, and Trump—in office and on the campaign trail—repeatedly railed against Europe’s unwillingness to spend more on defense.
In his first term, Trump, along with his administration’s pragmatists, like former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, rightfully complained about European intransigence—but they did not call for pulling all of America’s troops out immediately. Trump’s most extreme shift was to try to move one-third of America’s German-stationed troops to Poland—closer to, not further from, Russia and the U.S. Why? Because while Trump and other pragmatists would like to reorient American attention toward Asia, pulling the ripcord too quickly from Europe could make it harder to win over new allies in the forthcoming struggle against China.
Right now, Russia does not militarily threaten the United States, but it does threaten some European allies. If Asian states join us in a coalition against China, they will do so hoping that we will come to their aid even if China is one day put in Russia’s position: not a threat to the United States, but a threat to those around it. If America pulls entirely and rapidly away from all European allies now—even, say, the Baltic states, which have responded to our defense spending demands—it will send the message that we don’t mind leaving our allies high and dry. This absolutely doesn’t mean America must or should stay in Europe forever, but there is a difference between a telegraphed, methodical withdrawal and a speedy exit.
It’s a sharp contrast between Trump’s pragmatic approach and the general non-interventionist framing of America’s Europe policy. They would be happy outright disavowing, or working past, NATO’s Article V (of which the spirit, though not the letter, requires military engagement), “Europeanizing” the organization, and entirely disengaging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. This is not to say the Trump administration should not make efforts to lay the groundwork for a future reworking of things like Article V, but preparing the United States for the challenges posed by the remainder of the 21st century will require careful planning and will take longer than a single presidential term.
Asia is another point of difference between the two camps. While both groups view China as a threat, the non-interventionists see little need to “contain” China like America once did for the Soviet Union, and do not have a burning desire to defend Taiwan. Talk of “island chains” —the strategy of keeping American influence in key islands around the South China Sea to hem China in—is interpreted not as sound policy but as a means to get the United States, and the military-industrial complex, involved in decades of unbalanced alliances and increased military spending.
Pragmatists, however, see doing something more active as a potential necessity. They are frustrated by Taiwan’s lack of defense spending. But they believe China, if unchecked, will seek to weaken the United States—and that America cannot adopt a “Fortress America”-style solution. Pragmatists are firmly supportive of Taiwan and take the island chain strategy seriously, correctly seeing in China a desire to ultimately surpass the United States. If China can dominate Southeast Asia, it will likely intensify its efforts to dominate South America and the mineral-rich areas of Africa.
Trump, in his personage, policy pronouncements, and cabinet picks, has managed to combine the best of both pragmatism and non-interventionism, but seems to have leaned ever so slightly toward the pragmatists. He seems ready at a moment’s notice to draw down America’s participation in NATO. But, when one considers his earlier fury over French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion that Europe have its own army, it seems clear that his frustrations with NATO emanate more from Europeans not paying their fair share than out of an ideological commitment to pull all of America’s troops home. Plus, he has nominated pragmatists like Waltz and Colby for significant foreign policy positions. While non-interventionists like Tulsi Gabbard and Matt Gaetz were offered positions of import, they were noticeably not foreign policy roles; extreme non-interventionists, like retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor, have been passed over completely.
This should encourage onlookers. That approach benefited the country in his first term, and will support American security in his next. Trump’s assassination of Iran’s Qasem Soleimani—retaliation for attacks on American troops stationed in Iraq—is a prime example of how his balanced approach can pay real-world dividends for the U.S. Before the strike, the Pentagon presented Trump with a menu of options for a retaliatory strike months before, after Iran had destroyed an American drone. Killing Soleimani was listed as the most extreme option. Trump, at the time, refused to authorize a strike on Soleimani, saying he would only do so if an American was killed. When, months later, Iranian proxies killed an American contractor, Trump ordered the strike.
The event also highlights the problems not just in the old approach of the neocons, but the limitations of real-world response from non-interventionists. A neoconservative would likely have killed Soleimani for the drone being downed; Pompeo and Bolton had both pushed Trump to do exactly that, with one source saying Pompeo was “morose” that Trump had not agreed to kill Soleimani after the downing. A non-interventionist would likely have pulled America’s forces entirely out of the region at the downing of the drone (if not immediately upon taking office). Trump, however, sought to draw down America’s forces while keeping his options open for a retaliatory strike if Iran overstepped—which they did. This helped keep American troops and contractors safe; none would be killed until three years into the administration of President Joe Biden, who has been far softer on Iran and failed to come up with a strategy for the country.
Trump has already shown that he will continue his pragmatic streak during his 2nd term. Even on immigration—his top priority—he has shown balance, tapping hardliners like Tom Homan to oversee a mass deportation program while repeatedly stating an openness to allow illegal immigrants brought as children to stay in the country; he has also sided with Elon Musk in the recent H1-B visa dispute. Trump’s lean toward pragmatism has worked well for him: majorities of Americans approve of his decisions on immigration and foreign policy.
Some of this approach is surely just because of who Trump is: coiner of the “art of the deal” who, while governed by strong core ideas, has always been willing to be pragmatic to get results. While his wheeling and dealing can sometimes seem somewhat scattershot, his willingness to embrace new ideas is much of the reason the New Right has come to dominate the GOP in the first place.
Some of his pragmatism is also due to political necessity. While, as discussed, a majority of Republicans are skeptical of NATO, nearly 60% view it approvingly. Americans likewise will likely not feel comfortable trusting the oceans alone when it comes to keeping Chinese influence from threatening America. The flexibility inherent in the more pragmatic strand is a major asset: to make change, in foreign policy or otherwise, one first must win elections. While this does not mean future candidates should not be bold, they should remain aware of how Americans will react to sudden and significant changes.
But credit where credit is due: a slightly more pragmatic realism isn’t just popular; it’s the right path strategically. America’s natural ocean moat is indeed a powerful tool, but like the Soviet Union before it, there’s no inherent reason to assume China will be happy staying in its own backyard, even if it retakes Taiwan—witness their years of increasing influence in Panama and Latin America as a whole. The People’s Republic wishes to be at the top of the international order, the “Middle Kingdom” to which all other states pay homage. When President Xi Jinping says he wants to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” he is not envisioning an order in which China is a comfortable equal of the United States.
Keeping China from getting to a place of influence where it can endanger America’s way of life and national interest must be a, if not the, central goal of policymakers. Succeeding will require keeping America’s national interest as a guiding star via a pragmatic vision that can help make realism the mainstream American foreign policy view today, in 2028, and beyond.