Realignments Are Built After Election Day

Primaries don't sell a shift in economic thinking. But learning from Reagan can. By Henry Olsen

The process of converting the Republican Party from free market fundamentalism to a more balanced, “common good” approach focused on what a functioning economy owes to each citizen remains a work in progress.

With primary season almost over, it is notable that virtually no Republican House or Senate candidate has centered his or her campaign on support for the new conservative economics. That might strike some as odd given the high-profile nature of President Donald Trump’s tariffs. But it makes sense if one understands that support for Trump’s unorthodox economics is greater among general election swing voters than among the rock-ribbed conservatives who dominate primary electorates.

Primary election campaigns focus on the party base. Win that, and in most cases one will win the nomination. This is true for both parties, which is why one sees Democratic campaigns this cycle focused on fighting Trump and attacking Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Two other factors are also at play. One is the overwhelming GOP consensus on cultural issues, and the other is that Trump did not center his own 2024 campaign on his new economics. Does that undermine the case for his economic views? Not at all. Ronald Reagan’s example from 1980 shows that dramatic changes in party orthodoxy occur only when a presidential nominee pledges a new course, explains that new course during his campaign, and then successfully implements it during his tenure.

Those supporting such evangelization must ensure that the party’s 2028 nominee follows Reagan’s example in word and, if elected, in deed. Only that will fulfill the dream many hold of a multi-racial, working-class Republican Party.

Two credible pollsters, the Pew Research Center and GOP political strategy firm Echelon Insights, recently published large-scale analyses of partisan coalitions. Each found that the most solid Republican factions wanted smaller government and opposed an increased government role in providing health care or assistance to people in need. General arguments in favor of government action to help Americans, then, would run counter to the general sense of primary voters.

While the Pew survey found that large majorities of the party base factions support Trump’s tariffs, that is likely skewed by the high level of support GOP partisans have for Trump overall. The Echelon Insights survey found a large group of free traders remains among one of the two loyalist factions. Tariffs are thus not a good issue to run on in Republican primaries today because they tend to divide the electorate. Campaigning on an issue that has a substantial number of opponents is a risk in a multi-candidate primary, and accordingly few candidates are willing to take that risk.

That’s not to say that a winning nominee cannot back the new economics once they are in office. Senators Jim Banks, Josh Hawley, Bernie Moreno, and Eric Schmitt have made parts of the conservative reform agenda a centerpiece of their time in the upper house. But none of them made those deviations from previous party orthodoxy the central feature of their initial primary races. It’s quite possible that some of the newly elected Senators who kept a low profile on economic policy during their campaigns will turn out to be part of this caucus; we just don’t yet know which ones.

Candidates know that it’s much easier to run on issues that command super-majority support. Newly appointed South Carolina Senator Darline Graham recently cut a television ad outlining her views for the GOP primary electorate. They include the belief that every life is precious (an oblique nod to the pro-life community), that only United States citizens should vote in elections, and that “boys shouldn’t play in girls’ sports.” All of those views command supermajority support within the GOP, and none of her opponents disagree with her.

Most of this cycle’s Republican candidates contend that they support President Trump’s agenda. They talk about shutting down the border and opposing illegal immigration, another issue that aligns with Trump and on which there is little opposition within the party base (though it’s notable that this too was not orthodoxy prior to Trump’s 2016 campaign). Most candidates see little reason to say anything substantial about the economic policies that still divide official Washington.

These calculations lead to a collage of rather similar campaigns across the nation. I follow most primaries and watch as many ads as I can. They are remarkable in their similarity. Back Trump; stop illegal immigration; back traditional gun rights and cultural issues (which can include overt appeals to Christian faith in many Southern or rural areas). It’s a rare candidate who risks making an appeal that does not track these themes.

Things might have been different had Trump made economic renewal through an active federal government the primary centerpiece of his three campaigns. Those ideas were always present, even in his first speech of 2015. But they were drowned out by his emphasis on ending illegal immigration, fighting crime, and supporting the Republican cultural agenda. Swing voters heard that set of messages, and as a result started voting Republican—often for the first time in their lives. Moderate, well-to-do Republicans heard them too, and moved to the Democrats in part because they did not want those changes. But most Republicans focused on the items in Trump’s broad agenda they were already familiar with and overlooked the novel items.

The good news for reformists is that attitudes can change. We have already seen a significant change in Republican attitudes toward tariffs, moving from one-time opposition to more nuanced and in some cases supportive beliefs. Presidential rhetoric and action do impact public opinion, which makes the next big primaries—the 2028 GOP nomination battle—crucial if reformists are to continue their advance.

Ronald Reagan’s example is instructive on that score. His 1980 presidential campaign challenged longtime economic orthodoxy by placing the private sector, not the government, at the center of economic life. He proposed a 30% income tax cut that was revolutionary in its time. His specific advocacy of those themes in his campaign meant his presidency would be judged by whether he enacted them in office and whether they worked. He largely did, and they largely succeeded, creating the modern GOP tax cut and “just say no to government” orthodoxy.

The tax cuts example is especially important. Democrats had long believed that voters wanted more government programs even if they paid more in taxes: their motto since the New Deal had been “tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect.” Mid-twentieth-century Republicans cherished balanced budgets and generally supported tax cuts only if they were preceded by spending cuts. Tax cuts were the dessert, if you will, after the voters had eaten their vegetables.

Congressional Republicans approved Reagan’s landmark 1981 tax cuts mostly out of loyalty to the president rather than true belief. Once the deficit started to grow, GOP leaders such as Sens. Robert Dole (R-KS) and Pete Domenici (R-NM) often pushed Reagan to raise taxes. He gave in to them once, in 1982, on the promise that those tax hikes would be accompanied by three times the amount in spending cuts. When the cuts did not materialize, Reagan resolved not to give in to intra-party pressure again.

Reagan’s original platform included spending cuts, but he made clear that the tax cuts were not dependent upon reduced spending. In office, he failed to obtain Congressional support for cutting the budget nearly as much as he proposed. This forced him to choose between the balanced budget orthodoxy and cutting taxes. He chose the latter, and the American economy prospered even as budget deficits soared to then-record peacetime expansion highs for peacetime expansions.

The political impact was that Republicans learned voters cared more about income growth than government program expansion or fiscal prudence. After President George H.W. Bush violated his “no new taxes” pledge in 1991 to support a budget deficit reduction deal with Democrats—promoted by many of the same Congressional Republicans and advisors who had pressured Reagan—GOP voters and officeholders became even more convinced that Reagan’s approach was both good politics and good economics.

Any reform-minded Republican who believes in the new conservative economics needs to follow Reagan’s example. Step one: make a clear, comprehensive argument for why government-backed reindustrialization is in America’s interest. Step two: center the 2028 campaign on that idea and couple it with a few simple-to-understand policies. Step three: if elected, enact those policies and stand by them even under immense political pressure. Step four: if they work, bask in the glow and drive home their success during your re-election campaign.

That sequence will change minds and create a new Republican orthodoxy. After all, everybody loves a winner. Just as Reagan’s success between 1980 and 1984 begat the 1986 tax reform and every Republican tax cut since, the 2028 GOP nominee’s success can make a working-class-focused, common good economy the centerpiece of mid-twenty-first century Republican thinking.

Political change takes time. One election is rarely enough to alter a nation’s course, and it takes years for the lessons of even a successful alteration to sink into the broader consciousness. The fact that today’s Republican Congressional campaigns do not prominently feature Trump’s new economic thinking is not surprising under the circumstances. Reformers should not lose heart; the times, they are a-changin’.