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Richard's avatar

OK, I am not worried about the tariffs but I am worried about the Supreme Court. You have the 3 Democrats who will always rule against Trump. You have two solid justices and then you have 4 squishes who are more or less controlled by Roberts. Barrett will always go with him and he can usually get one of the other two. So it really depends on what Roberts decides to do. If the man has any actual principles, I am unable to detect them. He seems to want to preserve the institutional position of the Court so he tacks back and forth randomly. In trying to preserve the court he is actually undermining it.

Steve Shannon's avatar

The piece tries to project strategic calm, but it glosses over core legal, economic, and logical problems. Here’s a structured rebuttal.

1. The “Bizarre Situation” Framing Is Misleading

The author calls it “bizarre” that a president could regulate or embargo trade but not impose tariffs under IEEPA. That’s not bizarre—it’s statutory interpretation.

• IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) was designed for emergency economic sanctions, not general revenue-raising or trade restructuring.

• Congress wrote other statutes specifically to govern tariffs.

If Congress creates distinct tools for distinct purposes, it’s not “ironic” for the Court to enforce those boundaries. It’s separation of powers.

The comparison to John Roberts and the Affordable Care Act case is also weak. In the ACA case, the Court interpreted ambiguous statutory language to preserve constitutionality. Here, the Court interpreted a statute’s limits. Those are different judicial functions.

Calling this parallel “creative” judicial hypocrisy is rhetorical flourish, not legal reasoning.

2. The “No Substantive Effect” Claim Contradicts the Entire Argument

The essay argues:

• The ruling has little practical effect.

• Trump has ample alternative authorities.

• Negotiations will proceed unchanged.

If that’s true, why was IEEPA used in the first place?

The real reason:

IEEPA allowed speed, flexibility, and minimal process. That is precisely why the Court’s ruling matters.

Authorities like:

• Section 122 (Trade Act of 1974)

• Section 301 (Trade Act of 1974)

• Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962)

all require procedural steps, investigations, findings, and timelines. That is not a trivial distinction. It reduces executive discretion and slows coercive leverage.

The author quietly admits this when noting those authorities require “more thorough process.” That’s the point.

3. The “Marbury” Analogy Is Overblown

Invoking John Marshall and Marbury v. Madison is grandiose.

Marbury established judicial review. This case enforces statutory limits on delegated emergency powers.

There is no sweeping constitutional restructuring here—just reaffirmation that:

• Congress writes tariff law.

• Emergency statutes are not blank checks.

Equating this ruling with a foundational constitutional moment exaggerates its significance.

4. Section 122 Is Not a Clean Substitute

Section 122 allows temporary tariffs up to 15% for balance-of-payments purposes, but:

• It expires after 150 days without congressional extension.

• It requires specific economic justification.

• It is not a permanent restructuring tool.

The author frames this as “little will change in the short run,” but that short run is legally capped and politically uncertain. That is a meaningful constraint.

If Congress must act, that’s a shift of power away from unilateral executive action.

5. The Leverage Argument Is Economically Questionable

The piece assumes:

• Tariffs are effective negotiating leverage.

• Other countries will not “back out.”

• Supply chains will shift reliably due to tariff differentials.

But economic evidence from prior tariff cycles suggests:

• Tariff costs are largely borne domestically through higher prices.

• Supply chains shift slowly and often to other low-cost countries, not back to the U.S.

• Retaliatory tariffs can blunt leverage.

Leverage works when the threat is credible and sustainable. If authority is legally fragile or procedurally constrained, credibility diminishes.

6. The China Section Contains a Tension

The essay claims:

• Tariffs on China can go “as high as he might want.”

• China is an “obvious adversary.”

• Tariffs are central to supply chain realignment.

But also admits:

• The administration may reduce pressure ahead of a summit.

That exposes the core contradiction:

If tariffs are a long-term structural industrial policy tool, they cannot simultaneously be flexible summit bargaining chips.

You cannot signal both permanent decoupling and short-term détente without undermining credibility.

7. Revoking PNTR Is Not a Technical Adjustment

Revoking China’s PNTR would be a major structural shift in U.S.–China trade relations, not a tidy bipartisan housekeeping matter.

It would:

• Trigger significant tariff increases.

• Invite retaliation.

• Potentially violate WTO commitments.

• Disrupt multinational supply chains abruptly.

The essay frames this as clean and consensus-driven, but the economic consequences would be profound and politically costly.

8. The Transshipment Problem Is Not Easily Solved by Tariffs

The transshipment argument assumes:

• Third countries can easily be coerced into enforcing U.S. policy.

• Tariff threats are an effective enforcement mechanism.

In practice:

• Rules-of-origin enforcement is complex.

• Multilateral coordination is required.

• Excessive pressure risks alienating allies.

Tariffs alone do not solve transshipment; customs enforcement and trade agreements do.

9. The “More Powerful and More Crystal Clear” Claim Is Logically Backward

If:

• IEEPA authority is struck down,

• Temporary authority expires in 150 days,

• Other authorities require investigations and procedural steps,

• Congress must potentially legislate,

then presidential tariff power is not “more powerful.”

It is:

• More constrained.

• More procedural.

• More dependent on legislative cooperation.

That is not executive strengthening—it is institutional rebalancing.

10. The Central Omission: Congress’s Role

The essay treats congressional involvement as a technical detail rather than a constitutional design feature.

Trade authority was delegated to the executive in specific statutes with specific boundaries. When courts enforce those boundaries, they are not sabotaging trade strategy; they are preserving the separation of powers.

If the policy is sound, Congress can codify it.

If it cannot pass Congress, that suggests the issue is political consensus—not judicial obstruction.

Bottom Line

The ruling:

• Reinforces statutory limits.

• Forces reliance on clearer legal authorities.

• Reasserts congressional involvement.

• Reduces unilateral executive flexibility.

That may produce a more disciplined trade policy—but precisely because it constrains executive improvisation.

The essay attempts to portray constraint as empowerment. That rhetorical inversion does not survive scrutiny.

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